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THE PROBLEM OF GRUE ISN’T
WILLIAM M. BRIGGS
The so-called problem of grue was introduced by Nelson Goodman in
1954 [2] as a “riddle” about induction, a riddle which has been widely
thought to cast doubt on the validity and rationality of induction. That
unnecessary doubt in turn is partly responsible for the reluctance to
adopt the view that probability is part of logic: for that view see, e.g.,
[1, 4, 7]. Several authors have pointed out deficiencies in grue, most
notably [3, 7]. Nevertheless, the “problem” still excites some authors,
e.g. [6] (and references therein).
Here, adapted from Groarke (p. 65), is the basis of grue, along
with another simple demonstration that the “problem” makes no sense
(Groarke lists others, as does Stove).
Grue is a predicate, like green or blue, but with a built-in ad hoc
time component. Objects are grue if they are green and observed before
(say) 21 October 1978 or fast and observed after that date. A green
grape observed 20 October 1978 and a fast (say, white) car observed
22 October 1978 are grue. But if you saw the green grape yesterday,
or remember seeing the fast car in 1976, then neither are grue. The
definition changes with the arbitrary date.
Imagine it’s before the Date and you’ve seen or heard of only green
emeralds. Induction says future, or rather all unobserved, emeralds
will also be green. But since it’s before the Date, these emeralds are
also grue, thus induction also says all unobserved emeralds will be grue.
Finally comes a point after the Date, and lo, a green and not a fast
emerald appears, thus not a grue emerald. Induction, which told us
that emerable should be grue, is broken!
The reason we expect (via induction) unobserved emeralds to be
green is we expect that whatever is causing emeralds to be green will
remain the same through time. Whether this is the formal, material,
efficient, or final cause depends on the perspective one takes, of course.
We comprehend the essence of what it is to be an emerald is unchang-
ing. And that is what induction is: the understanding of this essence,
an awareness of cause. Rather, that is one form of induction. Groarke
[3] contends Aritotle’s epagoge is analogical and there are five types of
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induction; see his Chapter 4 for a delineation. See David Oderberg on
essentialism, [5].
Nobody has ever seen a fast emerald; neither are blithe, winsome,
electrifying, salty, nor brutal emeralds observed. Nobody has ever seen
a blue one either, yet it is blue that is the traditional predicate stated
in the “problem”, not fast or blithe... But the choice of predicate is
arbitrary; there is nothing special about blue. Using an absurd one like
fast makes the so-called problem of grue disappear, because we realize
that no emerable can suddenly change nature from green to fast. That
is, our understanding (via induction) that it is the essence of emeralds
to be green, that some thing or things are causing the greeness, is what
leads us to reject the idea that this cause can suddenly switch and
create blithe or fast emeralds instead of green ones.
Incidentally, there is no causation in the predicate grue, as has often
been noted. Which is to say, the riddle does not suppose emeralds
are changing their nature (meaning no change in any formal, material,
efficient, or final cause takes place), but that induction is supposed
to indicate that some change in nature should take place on the Date
but doesn’t. After all, some thing or things must operate to cause the
change. Grue, then, is a mix up in understanding causation.
Again, we do not know of any cause (or any type) that will switch
emeralds abruptly from green-mode to blue-mode. It is thus obvious
that the predicate blue is what caused (in our minds) the difficulty all
along. We observe that colors change in certain objects like flowers
or cars. Via induction, we expect that this change is natural or is of
the essence of these objects. Why? Because we’re aware of the causes
of color change which make the object at one time this color and at
another time that color. For instance, a leaf changing from green to
red on a certain date. This does not shock because we are aware of the
cause of this change. Amusingly, if we re-create the grue “problem” for
the leaf using green and red, and we get the right date, then grue-type
induction works for autumn leaves.
There was never anything wrong with induction. Far from causing
us to doubt induction, thinking about grue strengthens the confidence
we have in it because we realize that grue seemed problematic because
it tortured our understanding of what caused emeralds to be green.
References
[1] James Franklin. Resurrecting logical probability. Erkenntnis, 55:277–305, 2001.
[2] Nelson Goodman. Fact, fiction, and forecast. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1954.
[3] Louis Groarke. An Aristotelian Account of Induction. Mcgill Queens University
Press, Montreal, 2009.
THE PROBLEM OF GRUE ISN’T 3
[4] E. T. Jaynes. Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2003.
[5] David Oderberg. Real Essentialism. Routledge, London, 2008.
[6] Alfred Schramm. Evidence, hypothesis, and grue. Erkenntnis, 79(3):571–591,
2014.
[7] David Stove. The Rationality of Induction. Clarendon, Oxford, 1986.
New York City
E-mail address : matt@wmbriggs.com
URL: wmbriggs.com
